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COMMENT: THE OIRA MODEL FOR
INSTITUTIONALIZING CBA OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION
RYAN BUBB*
This comment is a brief response to the stimulating articles by Professors
1
2
Coates and Cox in this volume. In responding, I follow an important analytic
distinction that Coates makes that is critical for understanding the issues. One
important issue in financial regulation is what analytic framework and decision
procedure we want regulators to apply in setting policy. Given some resolution
of this first issue, a second analytically distinct issue is what institutional
framework of administrative decisionmaking will best bring about the
application by regulators of our preferred analytic approach and decision
3
procedure for financial regulation.
Beginning with the first issue, both Coates and Cox largely agree that policy
decisions about financial regulation should be made using what Coates refers to
4
as “conceptual cost-benefit analysis (CBA).” By conceptual CBA, Coates
simply means standard economic analysis of policy, in which the analyst (1)
specifies the problem the regulation aims to solve, (2) identifies and, when
possible, measures the costs and benefits of a range of regulatory options, and
(3) chooses the option that best optimizes the tradeoff between the costs and
5
benefits. As Coates puts it, CBA “remains the best available overarching
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1. John C. Coates IV, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Essay on Regulatory
Management, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 [hereinafter Coates, Towards Better CostBenefit Analysis] at 1. Coates’s article in this volume is a part of a larger project on cost-benefit analysis
in financial regulation to which this comment is also responsive. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015) [hereinafter
Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation].
2. James D. Cox, Regulating Securities Markets after Business Roundtable, 78 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 25.
3. Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 2; Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 5–6. Coates uses different terminology than I use here,
referring to the first issue of how regulatory decisions are made as “policy,” and the second issue of
institutional design as “law.” Id. Professor Robert Bartlett provides an illuminating analysis of the
various institutional frameworks that are currently used for CBA of financial regulation. See Robert
Bartlett, The Institutional Framework for Cost Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A Tale of Four
Paradigms?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S379 (2014).
4. Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 2–5; Cox, supra note 2, at 31
(“[A] close assessment of the costs and benefits matter a good deal in the sound formulation of
policy.”).
5. Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 5–6.
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conceptual framework for organizing and communicating the pros and cons of a
6
proposed regulation.” Amen to that.
Many objections to CBA of financial regulation that have been offered in
the literature are not really objections to conceptual CBA as a decision
7
procedure, but rather are objections to particularly stilted forms of CBA or are
objections to particular institutional mechanisms for bringing about some form
8
of CBA. An important contribution of Coates’s work is to clarify the terms of
this debate. Virtually everyone engaged in the debate over CBA of financial
regulation supports conceptual CBA as an analytic framework for financial
regulation.
Relatedly, both Coates and Cox urge more experimentation,
incrementalism, and retrospective review in financial regulation as ways to
9
produce better information to guide regulatory policy. Such methodological
innovations are undoubtedly long overdue, and not just in financial regulation
but in many policy domains.
Nonetheless, both articles express some skepticism about quantified CBA in
financial regulation. Coates’s skepticism stems in part from a set of detailed
case studies of how one might do quantified CBA in financial regulation, from
which he concludes that “precise, reliable, quantified CBA remains
10
unfeasible.” If quantification is exceedingly difficult, then a norm requiring
that costs and benefits be quantified might slow down or even paralyze the
regulatory process. It might also simply serve to camouflage the agency’s
11
discretionary choices by hiding them under “impressive numbers.” Cox raises
the related concern that it is often easier to quantify the costs of financial
12
regulation than to quantify the benefits. If so, then quantified CBA might
systematically lead to too little regulation. So their objections to quantified
CBA might stem in part from a concern that calls for quantified CBA of
financial regulation may be little more than thinly veiled attempts by those
13
opposed to financial regulation to gum up the regulatory works.
6. Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 5.
7. For example, Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues that applying CBA to financial regulation is a
“category mistake” because the financial system is a “constructed system” whereas CBA was
developed for “natural systems” like the environment. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for BenefitCost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S352 (2014). However, his criticism
boils down to a concern that it is hard to quantify the benefits and costs of financial regulation, and
hence his objection seems to be to a particular form of quantified CBA, not to conceptual CBA. See id.
at 6 (“[S]econd order effects make the benefits and costs of rule adoption impossible to quantify in a
meaningful way” and hence CBA “will encourage a myopic focus on what is measurable in a time
frame in which they can be measured.”).
8. See, e.g., Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 90–91.
9. Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 11–23; Cox, supra note 2, at 35–
44.
10. Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 95.
11. Id. at 92.
12. Cox, supra note 2, at 29–31.
13. Hence Coates refers to “interest groups seeking to delay [new financial regulations]” as among
the supporters of cost-benefit analysis for financial regulation. Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit
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Although those concerns about quantified CBA are well taken, they are a
bit overstated. Coates observes that he has yet to find a single example of a
“reliable, precise, quantified” CBA of a significant financial regulation, despite
14
significant efforts to identify one. This lack of quantitative CBA of financial
regulation stands in stark contrast to many other regulatory domains in which
highly sophisticated, quantitative CBA plays a central role, including
environmental, health, safety, and antitrust regulation. Why is financial
regulation such an outlier with relatively little CBA? Coates’s explanation is
that CBA of financial regulation is “an order of magnitude more difficult than
15
its advocates seem to believe.”
But relative difficulty of doing CBA in financial regulation seems an
unlikely explanation for its paucity. CBA in financial regulation is undoubtedly
difficult, for reasons both Coates and Cox adduce. But it is no more difficult—
indeed, it might be less difficult—than it is in many other domains in which it
16
plays a central role.
Consider, for example, climate policy. One of the most rewarding projects I
worked on in my time at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) prior to entering the legal academy was an interagency effort to
quantify the social cost of carbon for use in CBA of rules affecting greenhouse17
gas emissions. The uncertainties and complexities entailed by the effort were
in the extreme. To give just a taste, consider this: A substantial portion of the
estimated present value of the benefits of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions
today stems from resulting reductions in harm from global warming two18
hundred years from now. What will society look like in the year 2214? The
uncertainties are legion. But the interagency working group forged on and
produced a range of quantitative estimates that are now being used to inform
19
policymaking. Is quantified CBA of financial regulation really more
challenging than quantified CBA of climate policy? I think the answer is no.
An alternative explanation for the varying role of CBA across regulatory
domains leads to the second analytic issue: how best to institutionalize CBA as
a decision procedure. A key institutional impetus for the adoption of CBA in

Analysis, supra note 1, at 1.
14. Coates, Towards Better Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 1, at 10.
15. Id. at 3; Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 88.
16. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation 11 (CoaseSandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 660, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346466 (arguing that quantification may in fact be easier in financial
regulation than in other domains).
17. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, Technical Support Document—Social
Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis—Under Executive Order 12866 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf.
18. Id. at 25.
19. The social cost of carbon was estimated in order to allow agencies to incorporate the social
benefits from reduced climate change in regulations that would have a “marginal” effect on global
emissions. Id. at 1. For an example of its use, see Energy Conservation Standards for Refrigerated
Bottled or Canned Beverage Vending Machines, 10 C.F.R. § 431 (Aug. 31, 2009).
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environmental, health, and safety regulation was the imposition of centralized
regulatory review. A series of executive orders required executive agencies both
to conduct CBA and to submit their significant rules and accompanying analysis
20
for review by OIRA prior to publishing them in the Federal Register. Faced
with an external reviewer that held a quasi-veto right over their most important
regulations, executive agencies invested in analytic capacity for generating
21
sophisticated, quantitative CBA to guide policymaking.
In contrast, with the limited historical exception of the Office of the
22
Comptroller of the Currency, financial regulatory agencies are independent
agencies outside the scope of the executive orders mandating CBA and
23
centralized regulatory review. CBA plays little role in financial regulation not
because it is especially challenging but rather because institutional structures do
not produce incentives for financial regulators to develop and employ CBA.
The historical development of CBA in other regulatory domains thus
provides useful lessons for institutional reforms to improve CBA in financial
regulation. Consider in particular the adoption of CBA at the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). When President Nixon created the EPA in 1970, it
was staffed by political appointees and civil servants committed to its
environmental protection mission and highly motivated to issue new regulations
24
to protect the environment. But parallel to the inception of a mission-oriented
EPA was the emergence of centralized regulatory review and the requirement
that the agency, when not prohibited by statute, use CBA. Centralized
regulatory review is often dated back to an executive order issued by President
25
Reagan in 1981 that formalized the process, but the practice predates that
executive order by a decade. The EPA and the regulatory reviewers at the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) came into conflict shortly after the
26
EPA was created, and that conflict between the EPA and OMB (specifically
OIRA, the subunit of OMB now tasked with regulatory review) has continued
27
across presidential administrations and remains today.
20. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 14 (2011); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1993); Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
21. See Michael Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
609 (2014) (explaining that the imposition of OIRA review led the EPA to develop expertise in CBA of
environmental regulation).
22. Housed within an executive-branch agency, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was
subject to OIRA review under Executive Order 12,866 until it was specifically exempted from OIRA
review by the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act. See Bartlett, supra note 3, at S381.
23. Id.
24. See Ryan Bubb & Patrick Warren, Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. 95, 128 (2014).
25. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
26. See ALFRED A. MARCUS, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE: CHOOSING AND IMPLEMENTING
AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 125 (1980) (describing how the OMB forced the EPA to submit its
regulations for review beginning in 1971).
27. For example, Cass Sunstein, the first Administrator of OIRA in the Obama administration,
returned the EPA’s proposal to regulate ozone more stringently, explaining that the president had
“instructed [him] to give careful scrutiny to all regulations that impose significant costs on the private
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In response to both the executive-branch norm that the agency use CBA,
and to the conflict between the EPA and bureaucrats at OIRA who passed
judgment on the quality of its CBA and on its proposed rules, the EPA
developed substantial analytic capacity, both in house and in a network of
28
government contractors. And the mission orientation of the EPA staff helped
mitigate potential ossification of the agency’s regulatory process produced by
regulatory review. Today it is not unusual for significant rules issued by the
EPA to be accompanied by many hundreds of pages of supporting analytic
29
materials. The creative tension within the executive branch between the EPA
and OIRA has produced more and better information and analysis for
30
regulatory decisionmaking. For example, when the interagency effort to
quantify the social cost of carbon was initiated, the working group was able to
rely on substantial in-house expertise at EPA on the relevant economic models
of climate change.
This history suggests a similar approach could be successful in
institutionalizing CBA of financial regulation. A norm requiring conceptual
(and, when possible, quantified) CBA in financial regulation should be
established. To provide meaningful incentives for the financial regulatory
agencies to implement that norm, the agencies’ rules and accompanying CBA
31
should be subject to review by a body external to the agencies. That review
process should be given teeth by authorizing the reviewing body to reject rules
that lack a sound policy basis or for which the costs and benefits have not been
identified and quantified to the extent feasible. A clearer sense of mission in
each agency should be institutionalized to combat any increased risk of
ossification in the regulatory process.
32
Which brings me to the infamous Business Roundtable decision. Coates
and Cox are each vociferous critics of the decision on both legal and functional
33
grounds, and their articles share a common theme that courts should play a
limited role in reviewing agency CBA.
An additional reason for skepticism about judicial review of CBA relates to
sector” and “does not support finalizing the rule at this time.” Letter from Cass Sunstein, Adm’r, Office
of Info. and Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, EPA (Sept. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ozone_national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf.
28. Livermore, supra note 21.
29. For example, the regulatory impact analysis for the EPA’s recent Clean Power Plan proposed
rule ran some 376 pages. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Carbon Pollution Guidelines for
Existing Power Plants and Emission Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Power Plants, EPA,
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/111dproposalRIAfinal0602.pdf.
30. Bubb & Warren, supra note 24, at 127–30.
31. Professor Bartlett similarly advocates for a form of intra-executive branch review of financial
regulatory agencies’ CBA in order to improve the use of CBA in financial regulation. See Bartlett,
supra note 3, at S399–S403. However, he envisions a weaker form of review than proposed here,
emphasizing the desirability of an “effectively unenforceable obligation” for financial agencies to use
CBA. Id. at S382.
32. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
33. Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 28–29; Cox, supra note
2, at 27–31.
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one of Coates’s important big-picture points: that institutionalizing CBA is
largely a challenge of management. One of the reasons OIRA was so successful
in spurring the development of analytic capacity at the EPA and other
executive agencies is that it collaborated with the agencies in both developing
cost-benefit methodology and in incorporating the outputs of CBA into
agencies’ proposed rules. When the EPA submits a proposed rule and
accompanying analysis to OIRA for review, the result is not an adversarial
hearing but rather a series of conference calls and meetings. Policy analysts at
the EPA and at OIRA, as well as at other relevant agencies, informally work
through the analytical issues together. What emerges is a substantially improved
work product. Judicial review is ill-suited to replicating this type of
organizational process.
The Business Roundtable decision, however, has shaped the debate over
CBA in financial regulation in an unfortunate way. The choice seems to be
framed as either (1) having judges on the D.C. Circuit using some form of CBA
legal requirement to routinely reject rules they deem lacking, or (2) simply
hoping that despite the lack of any substantial institutional reform, agencies will
start investing in needed analytic capacity for CBA and seriously employing it
in their decisionmaking. For example, Coates writes that “new legal mandates
for [CBA] . . . would be a bad idea” and that instead “[CBA] should be
conducted only to the extent and in the manner the expert agencies choose to
34
do so.”
But there are options for institutionalizing CBA in financial regulation other
than legal mandates subject to judicial review, à la Business Roundtable, or
complete agency autonomy. In particular, a CBA and regulatory-review regime
for the independent financial regulatory agencies could be fashioned along the
lines of OIRA review. The OIRA model has been a substantial success in other
regulatory domains, and there is no reason why that model could not be
similarly successful in financial regulation.
Notably, Coates’s skepticism about the feasibility of quantification in
financial regulation in particular is not an objection to applying to financial
regulation CBA as it is practiced in the executive agencies under OIRA’s
supervision. Executive Order 12,866 mandates quantification only when
35
feasible, and agencies subject to it routinely do not quantify benefits and costs
36
of rules.
There are of course numerous legal and institutional challenges to
developing an OIRA-type regime for financial regulation. Perhaps most
importantly, it is not clear how compatible OIRA review is with the various
ways that independent agencies are, well, independent. When I was at OIRA,
the staff at the agencies listened to me, at least some of the time. Although I
34. Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation, supra note 1, at 91.
35. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 190, § 6(a)(3)(C) (1994).
36. See Cass Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1370–71 (explaining
that executive agencies are frequently unable to quantify the benefits or costs of their rules).
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would like to think that was because of the ineluctable logic of many of my
arguments, I suspect that where I sat in the org chart was often more important.
If the agency staff and I could not resolve an issue, it was elevated to the
administrator of OIRA and the relevant senior political appointee at the
promulgating agency to resolve. Failing their agreement, it went up the chain in
the White House, and ultimately the President was indeed “the decider.”
The chain of command in independent agencies does not run to the White
House. Accordingly, OIRA itself might not be the right institution to play the
role of external reviewer, at least not without more far-reaching reforms to the
37
governance of the financial agencies. The devil is surely in these
implementation details, but this sort of challenge seems to me to be eminently
solvable. And I would encourage critics of judicial review of CBA, like
Professors Coates and Cox, to consider seriously such an intraexecutive branch
solution to institutionalizing CBA for financial regulation.

37. Bartlett, supra note 3, at 12–13.

